These twin goals are best achieved if Sweden, the current holder of the EU’s rotating presidency, convenes a summit on the model of the Thessaloniki conference of June 2003. Thessaloniki II could serve as a venue for the members and would-be members of the EU to discuss pending bilateral issues and ensure that they do not interfere with the accession process; negotiate a joint action plan to respond to the global financial crisis; and agree a pragmatic road map for EU integration, all in the framework of stronger regional co-operation.

As immediate signals that the process of enlargement to the Western Balkans is still on track, the summit should offer candidate status to the two countries that have submitted membership applications – Albania and Montenegro – and the start of membership talks to FYROM, a candidate since 2005. Enactment and implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia should be accelerated, with a clear road map towards candidate status outlined for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Kosovo needs an unambiguous promise that the EU will consider its membership application once it has reformed sufficiently, without prejudice for those member states that have not yet recognized its independence. After all, the EU is negotiating Turkey’s accession even though several member states have made it clear that they oppose the country’s entry.

The summit should also offer the Western Balkans a quick-start package to support membership preparations by giving the countries of the region access to select membership benefits starting in 2010. This would underscore that they are indeed part of Europe. The summit should decide on the immediate scrapping of visa requirements for all students and accelerate visa-free travel for all citizens of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The summit also needs to adopt measures to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis and to re-emphasise the importance of strengthening programmes to promote social inclusion and social cohesion. This includes the possibility to re-direct pre-accession funding to budget support; a requirement that loan agreements with international financial institutions be in line with accession and pre-accession priorities; and ensure high-level EU representation in missions by these institutions. Regional co-operation, including on financial and economic matters, should also be given a high priority.

A tangible commitment to a strengthened relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans would serve as a wake-up call both to the EU and the region that a stark choice is to be made: to be part of the EU or remain on its fringes. After the ratification of the Lisbon treaty by all 27 member states, which is only a formality following the signing of the treaty by Vacláv Klaus, the president of the Czech Republic, on 3 November, the EU is now in a position to offer a reasonable political perspective to the Balkans. The countries of the region must take reform seriously for the sake of their populations and not just in order to tick boxes during a technical accession process. At the same time, the blocking of negotiations as a result of bilateral disputes should be ended. Instead, a more flexible commitment to the integration of the region needs to be put in place, in which the countries of the Western Balkans play a full part in ongoing debates about the meanings of the common European Union project.

Christophe Solioz, Center for European Integration Strategies, Geneva and Dr. Paul Stubbs, Institute of Economics, Zagreb.

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To many in DC this was a surprise.  The visit itself and the value of someone like Biden leading it were questioned.   At a relevant conference only two weeks before his visit at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars arguments were made that  neither Biden nor Secretary Clinton should actually visit the country because of their principle roles in several episodes of the wars in former Yugoslavia.  Serbians would not welcome anyone but Obama, and he was too busy dealing with areas of major concern for US policy and would not be available for the trip.

This was the discussion in one of the few think tanks in Washington that actually sees Serbia as a partner and explores scenarios for faster integration of the country to Euro Atlantic structures.

The problem in DC is that most Southeast Europe experts come from the Clinton era and have made a career in the field using strong anti Serb language which was the appropriate vehicle for acceptance at the time. To understand the long-held anti-Serb attitude in the city, one needs only to look to the Easter Monday conference at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) titled “Completing America’s Mission in the Balkans”.

At the conference, policy experts focused mostly on Kosovo but when the role of Serbia was discussed the tone came straight out of the late 90’s.  The first issue addressed was General Mladic, presented as a criticism to President Bush’s administration efforts to reengage and increase cooperation in the security and military areas starting in 2006.  It is hard to understand what is the benefit for the region as a whole by promoting the Mladic argument at the top of the US-Serbia discussion agenda but even harder to explain the discussion relating to “regret”.  Even if Mladic was arrested does the Serb society have enough regret about their role in the Balkan atrocities of the 90’s?  Do Serb citizens understand their crimes?  Have they repented?

It is in many ways convenient to assume the moral high ground in any discussion.  There is an unquestionably strong moral argument to arrest Mladic, nevertheless the overall premise is based on a simplistic but also trouble-free view relating to the state of Serbia.  Simplistic because it assumes that if Serbia wanted it would deliver Mladic to the Hague court tomorrow – trouble free because Serbia is too small of a villain with no immediate need for rapprochement and no vocal opposition to the counterproductive arguments against it.

Several expert views in the city are pushing the Mladic and “regret” agenda and unfortunately the individuals expressing these views are in many cases not lobbyists.  They truly believe what they are saying and are sincere about their positions.  They seem well intentioned and truly concerned about the wellbeing of the region and its future development but also blinded by their moral stance and unable to understand that there is no sense of talking about regional stability and economic growth with Serbia excluded from the discussion.

It is not clear how influential these experts would be in future Washington debates on the role of Serbia or if they would alter their stance incorporating more constructive criticism of the process.  What is clear following Biden’s visit (the highest US official to visit Belgrade since Jimmy Carter in 1980) is that the Obama administration has the willingness to engage a reformed Serbia and clearly sees the necessity of Serbia’s inclusion in any future arrangements that would guarantee regional stability and growth.

A second series of arguments that is present in Washington but also several European capitals is the perceived choice provided to the Serbian people.  The choice of diverting paths, the first looking West while the second linking them to Russia – as if good relationships with Russia and membership of the EU are contradictory.

Almost all the Southeast Europe states that have had a history under Ottoman rule have a relationship with Russia which played some role in their independence movement.  For Serbia the relationship is reinforced with a common religion and notions of a Slavic brotherhood past but that link remained “historical” during the Cold War with Yugoslavia outside Russian influence and with a clearly more “western” orientation than many of the East European states that are now part of the EU.

With a perception of unfair and unequal treatment by the international community still present it is telling that in December 2008 only 13% of Serbians stated that they do not support the country’s accession into the EU with over 60% being strongly in favor.  Looking at the numbers relating to attitudes of the younger generation is even more revealing.  Isolated for many years, the generation of Serbs born in the war has experienced a life of exclusion, never having enjoyed the freedom that their parents had during the cold war. Contrary to the common belief that this generation is more active in the “national” cause, the 18-29 age group actually seeks faster integration with the west with over a 12% difference when compared with the rest of the population.  In the end, the basic values and outlook of the Serbian people have always been European something visible in every aspect of life from culture to history to politics.

This should be the starting point of any discussion considering the future of Serbia — the question should not concern diverting paths but rather a mechanism for faster inclusion.  The US administration has made an extremely important first step and it is time for the EU to accelerate the process of inclusion by making a similar leap and lifting visa requirements for Serbs before the end of the year. The old soviet system perceived the ability to interact and compare so threatening it had walls built to prevent it while the EU seems to be creating one as if it wished to actually create an opposition to EU values goals and aspirations by blinding a generation of Serbs.

All things considered it is doubtful General Mladic would be traveling……

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At the same time, the authors offer to the other side a set of exclusions to the use of this name, which are likely, in the long run, to render the “international” name obsolete, similar to the currently fossilized, temporary name of “FYROM”.  Moreover, the authors adopt Skopje’s escalating arguments that the resolution of the problem with the country’s name should also take into consideration and adopt the derivatives of Macedonia –-i.e. “Macedonian” language, ethnicity, products etc—without any suffix, prefix or compound of terms. In the view of the ICG authors, compromise on these issues on the part of Skopje is “out of the question”

Going carefully through the report, one remains with the impression that its authors are shying away from tackling the core of the problem.  Their concern is to provide a semblance of a balanced proposal simply in order to encourage international “actors” to reverse the Bucharest unanimous decision of NATO leaders[2] and open the way for moving with FYROM’s candidacy in the EU.

Apart from the new state name, the proposal aims at “rebuilding” trust on the basis of three guidelines:

• Skopje should “desist from moves …offending Greek sensitivities about the Hellenic heritage”

• Both sides should examine treatment of their “common history of the region from ancient(sic) times to modern times”
• Pending an agreement on the name, Skopje should use the provisional name  [FYROM] in multirateral forums and, in response, Greece should “drop its threat to veto Macedonia’s membership of NATO and accession negotiations with the EU”.

With trust restored, the international actors should apply “pressure” on the two parties, “especially Greece”, in order to retreat from its alleged “maximal” positions.

Comments

The ICG has been known for its well researched reports over the years.  The current one, however, despite the efforts of the contributors, reveals certain serious lacunae.  Originating from its headquarters in Pristina, it reveals a solid appreciation of the Albanian factor in shaping Skopje’s priorities. Nevertheless, on the “name issue” with Greece, the argument of regional instability of the early years of this decade is hardly a convincing one.  Lack of sufficient and dependable information from inside Greece has compelled the authors to rely on third parties or observers in order to assess major changes that have occurred over the last decade in Greek perceptions of the problem.  To summarize these perceptions:

1. The official Greek position in no way can be viewed today as a “maximal” one.  With considerable cost, political elites in the country have overrun public feelings about the use of the Macedonian name by the neighboring country.  The Greek government as well as all major parties, favor a compound geographical name for their neighbor country, provided its state name clearly defines Macedonian regions within its jurisdiction.  The current constitutional name, however, “Macedonia”, is identical with the name of the wider geographic region “Macedonia”. Of this region, 52 per cent is Greek territory, 9 per cent  Bulgarian and 1,5 per cent Albanian.  UN negotiator, Matthew Nimetz, has apparently realized that such a tautology of the names for two different geographical regions could become a harbinger for expansionist claims.  His latest proposal, “North Macedonia”, although tentatively might provide a way out of the current impasse, certainly is not a perfect one, as it might convey the impression of a divided country.  In this reviewer’s opinion, the parties should accept the name used by the inhabitants of FYROM for their region of geographical Macedonia  i.e. “Vardar Macedonia”, or preferably “Vardar Makedonija”

2. The second development was the disappointment of the Greeks over the course of the negotiations following the signing of the 1995 Interim Accord which regulated their mutual relations, minus the differences over the name. In their view, despite the fact that they extended a generous helping hand to the Slav Macedonians (economic, political, diplomatic and even military)  during the 10-year duration of Accord, Skopje failed to contribute in finding a mutually acceptable solution to the “name issue”[3] .  On the contrary, overlooking the letter and spirit of the 1993 UN Security Council resolution of 1993,  it lobbied hard to secure bilateral recognition of its constitutional name by a considerable number of states, aiming to render the UN resolution obsolete[4].

3. The third, an even more disturbing development to Greek public opinion, particularly to the Greek Macedonians, was a re-appraisal of the ethnogenetic dogma of the “Macedonian” ethnicity.  In their view, the state controlled educational system in FYROM, by extending the historical roots of the new nation to classical antiquity, was encroaching upon an illustrious past which had been recorded in the annals of Hellenic heritage, almost a millennium prior to the arrival of Slavic tribes in the region.  Moreover, by claiming the entire geographic Macedonian region of modern times as their “tatkovina” (fatherland), they laid claim to everything Macedonian.  As a result, the new generation of children, graduating from schools since the emergence of an independent Macedonian state, in 1991, have espoused the new dogma, which their over 45-year old elders, are at a loss to comprehend[5].

4. With the emergence of a new generation of politicians in Skopje, belonging to the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE party, some of them, with family roots in Greek Macedonia, resurface issues and grievances dating back to the Greek Civil War of 1945-1949 , apparently claiming a restitution for family sufferings. For the past two decades, the Greeks have managed to mend fences of their savage fratricidal war. Nevertheless, in FYROM, third generation descendants of the so-called “Egejski” refugees, including the current Prime Minister Gruevski, attempt to rekindle the travails of that period.  The Greeks are certainly aware of the role of Tito’s Yugoslavia and more so of the nationalists of Skopje at the time, in fanning the armed conflict in Greece, aspiring  in the vain to profit for themselves.  By now, it is well known that the price for the Yugoslav support to the Greek communist insurrection at the time, was Greek Macedonia. To reopen old wounds, on both sides of the border, in the midst of negotiations over the “name issue” would hardly be productive.

Concluding remarks

To paraphrase slightly the ICG report, it is evident, that no matter how “mystifying to outsiders”(with partial knowledge of the issue) the dispute touches existential nerves in both Macedonias : the independent state “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”  and the region of “Greek Macedonia” of the Hellenic Republic.

To resolve the dispute one has to approach with a constructive spirit the “existential” elements of both parties.  It is evident that the dispute is not simply the state name of Greece’s neighbor; it is what is conveyed through it.

Skopje—and third parties offering their services for a compromise solution– need to understand that the geographical region of Macedonia, which includes the entire province of  “Greek Macedonia”, is not and cannot be considered the “tatkovina” (fatherland) of the Makedonski people, living in FYROM.
This is a red line for Greece and the Greeks.

Similarly, Slav Macedonians, should realize that their newly conceived ethnogenetic dogma, extending to classical antiquity, encroaches upon the Hellenic cultural heritage and the identity of their Greek neighbors to the south[6]. As such it threatens to ignite a clash of identities in the region as a whole.

The use of the Macedonian name as a state appellation, in no way confers the right to appropriate everything and anything derived from or pertained to the entire region of Macedonia. This needs to be legally clarified and to remain binding “erga omnes”.

In the opinion of this reviewer, the task ahead is the search for enduring solutions to outstanding issues; otherwise, classical “diplomatic” escape clauses  would bequest the problem to future generations.

Consequently, the following summary proposals might complement the ICG report:

• The state name needs specifically to refer to the region of FYROM (see p.1), to apply erga omnes, in multilateral and bilateral international relations and transactions, by all  organizations, states, and other non-governmental international organizations, including the government and the agencies of FYROM.

• Its derivatives should follow the agreed state name.  State identity cards, passports etc would inscribe the citizenship in accordance to the state name.

• On issues touching upon the self-identification of persons, which includes their ethnicity, this reviewer holds the opinion that their right to self-identify themselves should be respected.  This means that the name by which they identify themselves in their language –Makedontsi—should be respected in all foreign languages, including the Greek. A similar arrangement might apply to the use of Makedones for the Greek Macedonians.

[1] ICG, “Macedonia’s Name: Breaking the Deadlock”, Europe Briefing No. 52, Pristina/Brussels, 12 Jan. 2009, 12pp.

[2] The NATO decision passed in April 2008, with President Bush consenting, provided that an invitation to Skopje “will be extended as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached”

[3] Consult, Athens-Skopje. An Uneasy Symbiosis,(1995-2002), editors Ev. Kofos, Vl. Vlasidis, Museum of Macedonian Struggle and ELIAMEP, Thessaloniki/Athens, 2005, 268 pp.

[4] Res. UN S/RES817/1993 stressed that the difference over the name of the state “needs to be resolved in the interest in the interest of maintaining peaceful and good-neighbourly relations in the region”

[5] Former President Kiro Gligorov was categorical that the present Makedontnsi are descendants of the first Slavic tribes which reached the region after the 6^th century AD.  A few years ago, cabinet ministers, in Skopje, in interviews with this writer, were complaining that they could not communicate with their teenage children, who insisted that “they were descendants of Alexander the Great”.

[6] Over 90% of  the ancient Macedonian Kingdom at King Philip’s time is located within the present province of Greek Macedonia, including the ancient capitals of Aegae and Pella.

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This year’s Halki International Seminar commenced by examining the transatlantic alliance in context, and in particular, “high” politics, policies and priorities. The first session was devoted to the assessment of past policies and the definition of future priorities of the Transatlantic Partners while the second session focused on the external perceptions of the EU and NATO, questioning the extent to which the transatlantic alliance contributes today to regional and global security. A common point that emerged from the comments of several speakers during both sessions was on one hand the perceived U.S. dominance of NATO and the importance of the US forthcoming elections for the policy agenda. A common theme as to the past and future of the transatlantic alliance was the transition from an East-West approach of international politics to that of a pluralist approach of the global scene. This transition has been a challenge for NATO which has yet to define its policies in relation to the emergence of new economic (and, increasingly, political) powers such as China and India. Finally, a commonly shared point was that the European defense and security policy should be strengthened while it was underlined that the EU is the only actor with a truly multilateral potential.

The main part of the 2008 Halki International Seminar was devoted on regional challenges and the role of the transatlantic alliance, starting with the situation in Kosovo and the Western Balkans in the light of developments that have taken place since the beginning of the year. A shared point was that the stability and future development of countries in the region depends both on their European perspective and NATO membership, as well as the internal strengthening of their institutions and their democratic legitimacy. Russia’s influence was also referred to as a crucial factor for the future shape of the Western Balkans due to its economic investments and energy supplies, as well as its position on the Kosovo issue.

The question of Kosovo’s independence was a key issue that dominated discussions not only on the first day but in later stages of the seminar as well. As the participants came from different countries and different backgrounds, they had the opportunity to listen and analyze different point of views, such as the position of Russia, the policies of Serbia as well as the role of international actors like NATO and the UN, and to compare and contrast the challenges in the area with developments taking place in other regions.

Discussions during the second day focused on (a) the “frozen conflicts” in the Black Sea Region and the Caucasus and (b) the regional challenges in the Middle East, in relation to the Kurdish question and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Regarding the question of “frozen conflicts” it was interesting to discuss the parallel lines that are drawn between the situation in Kosovo as it stands at the moment and the geopolitical conditions in the Black Sea and Caucasus. It was asserted that the later region has a special character that derives from the fact that -depending on one’s perspective-, at the same time it represents the next transatlantic challenge, is part of the European neighborhood, is viewed as the common neighborhood between Russia and the EU, or it is perceived as part of Russia’s historical and contemporary sphere of influence. The impact of Russian policies was also discussed in both panels, as well as Turkey’s position regarding the Kurdish question. In this light it was asserted that the area could function as the barometer for the relationship between all the above actors.

In discussing the question of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the prospects for “peace in our time” all participants held a rather pessimistic view as to the prospect of a solution in the forthcoming future. However, most of them shared similar views as to the factors that currently affect the development of events and the steps that should be taken towards the gradual resolution of the conflict. Naturally, as the sensitive nature of the subject suggests, the views that were expressed varied in character and intensity. Characteristically, all participants agreed on the fact that the international community has to be actively engaged in order for a peaceful resolution to be plausible, while in the regional context it was expressed that both sides have to focus on their internal problems in order to find common grounds of rapprochement.

The final day of the seminar started by focusing on Iraq, Iran and the Gulf region, discussing the need for a regional security architecture. A common theme that emerged was that the Iraq war has affected the regional balance of power, enabling Iran to considerably strengthen its position. Nevertheless, it was also argued that Iran itself is heading towards a period of change in its internal balance of power, with a new, transitional, generation of politicians that will bring a change in the system, unknown to which direction, however; this forthcoming process of change, while crucial, is not largely understood and appreciated outside Iran. Once again the question of the forthcoming American elections was put forward as a significant factor to consider when analyzing the future of Iraq and the Gulf region, while interestingly it was pointed out that Iran has succeeded where the USA has largely failed, in influencing Iraq.

The “young leaders’ forum” took place in two parallel sessions, focusing on Southeastern Europe and Black Sea and Caucasus respectively. On the first session discussions turned mainly around the question of Kosovo as well as the name issue of FYR Macedonia, as the two issues currently dominate the politics of SE Europe. Direct lines were drawn between the question of Kosovo’s recognition by the international community, Albanian’s position and the alleged Albanian irredentism. On the latter it was pointed out that idea of “Great Albania” has reemerged not by Albanians themselves but out of the fears of their neighboring countries. During the second session, on Black Sea and Caucasus, participants discussed Russia’s position and influence in the region, the question of the “frozen conflicts” and the prospects for conflict resolution in relation to the prospects of EU enlargement in the region. Characteristically it was argued by a number of participants that in contrast to other international players, the EU is viewed by Azerbaijan, Armenia, Moldova and other countries in the region as an ‘honest broker’, an element that strengthens the influence the EU can have in conflict resolution. It was asserted, however, that the challenge today is to define the nature of the conflicts in the region, drawing the line between ethnic and political.

The final session of 2008 Halki International seminars was devoted on revisiting the transatlantic initiatives in the regional conflicts discussed during the seminars, including views and perceptions from both Brussels and the regions. An overview of current and future policies was thus provided from the perspective of the EU, the Middle East and the Black Sea, including remarks on the future challenges NATO will be called to address. While the success of certain projects such as the EU initiative “Union for the Mediterranean” remains to be seen, it was asserted that any prospects for conflict resolution in the Middle East depend both on the adoption of common initiatives by Europe and the United States, as well as the adoption of the idea of political liberalization by regimes in the Middle East. From a Black Sea perspective it was also asserted that, similarly to the Middle East, NATO does not have a positive image in the Black Sea region as it is regarded that its activities go beyond its stated mission.

While the seminars were rigorous and took over an important part of the day, Halki International Seminars is not only about presentations and debate. The “spirit of Halki” as often referred too, once again overtook participants and organizers alike. Relaxation by the sea alternated with discussions around tables filled with Halki delicacies and concluded with night partying and swimming. In any case, exchanging views and ideas cannot be limited inside a conference room and indeed it is hard to find a place more picturesque and beautiful than the island of Halki, to make new contacts, create lasting friendships and gather experiences commonly shared and remembered by all Halki participants.

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In its Green Book on Energy Policy of March 2006 the EU Commission emphasized that the world has entered a new energy age where Europe is challenged to develop a comprehensive common energy policy with strengthened diversification of forms of energy, countries of origin and transit routes. The June 2006 EU summit added that energy policy should be supported by all available instruments including CFSP and ESDP. This in particular should embrace also strategic partnerships with the most important producer, transit and user countries.

A special role in the EU Commission’s considerations of diversification plays natural gas. Gas will take an ever growing importance within the EU´s energy mix because for the years to come strong increases of the demand for gas in industry as well as from private households, but in particular for the production of electricity, are expected. Today the EU imports roughly half of its needs of gas, and from this again one half comes from Russia – the remaining imports originate from Norway and Algeria. However, according to a prognosis of the Austrian energy concern OMV, the EU will for its demand of natural gas already be dependent by 80 % on imports in 2030! If that becomes true, where shall these additional deliveries come from? Only two alternatives are given: either increased deliveries from Russia which would mean an increased share in EU´s imports and thus a rising dependency on Russia, or the quest for new sources of procurement.

Dependencies concerning energy deliveries between Russia and Europe are, however, not at all one-sided. Europe is a secure and reliable customer for Russia. Gazprom´s sales to Europe make up 65 % of the enterprise´s profits, in physical terms they represent only 35 % of the total deliveries, the rest going into domestic consumption and some minor exports elsewhere! The rapidly growing Russian economy will increase its demand for energy which might have delimitating effects on Russia’s export possibilities prompting her therefore also to search for additional resources – in competition to the EU!

Since 2002 the EU was trying to find access to the energy resources in the Caspian region, in Central Asia and in the Middle East. Southeast Europe was hereby identified as an important transit region and transit hub. It turned out that far-reaching unity of interests exists with regard to future energy supply security between the EU and the SEE countries whereby concerning the latter also the prospect of EU´s financial engagement plays an important role. As a result of years long negotiations and consultations, called the “Athens Process”, on October 25, 2005, the “Treaty Establishing the Energy Community” was signed (in Athens), the first multilateral treaty in new Southeast Europe after the bellicose turmoils and changes of the 1990s. The contract partners of the Treaty are on the one side the EU (Greece thus is participating), on the other side the nine Southeast European countries (Alb., B&H, BG, CRO, FYROM, MN, RO, Serbia, and Kosovo under UNMIK 1244), Turkey will negotiate later. There are two goals, first to establish a common integrated electricity market, which means that the countries of the region shall take over the acquis communautaire of the EU in the area of energy thus extending the integrated energy market of the EU to Southeast Europe: rules of environmental protection, competition, market opening, investment guaranties and regulation supervision. This shall also help to harmonise the still very different rules and law frameworks in the region and thus promote and ease the necessary future co-operation in his field.

From the viewpoint of the EU, however, more important is the second target of the Treaty, namely to prepare Southeast Europe for its foreseen role as transit region for the diversified energy supply for Central and Western Europe, but also for Southeast Europe itself, through the build up of a transportation and distribution network for natural gas from the Caspian region and Central Asia.

Until recently four projects had been identified: the Nabucco pipeline (Turkey – Bulgaria – Romania – Hungary – Austria), the Central Balkans Line (alternative to Nabucco: Turkey - Greece – FYRoM – South Serbia – Bosnia-Herzegowina – Croatia), a liquid natural gas (LNG) terminal in Northern Dalamatia (Krk Island in Croatia – but also Slovenia showed interest), and the so-called Italy pipeline (Turkey – Greece – Apulia).

At present the Nabucco project dominates the (political) discussion because Gazprom/Moscow (Gazprom is owned by 51 % by the Russian state!) is not at all excited to notice that a realisation of the project will jeopardise its attempts to gain a quasi-monopoly position in the supply of the EU and also of Southeast Europe. Gazprom has evidenced distinct attempts not only to strengthen its position in the EU’s gas imports but also to get hold upon the domestic distribution networks in Europe, in particular in England, Germany, Italy and Greece.

The first competitive project to Nabucco had been launched by Gazprom already in February 2006 proposing a pipeline which would extend the existing “Blue Stream Line“ from South Russia to Northern Turkey (through the Black Sea) , which at present is not fully used, from Ankara via Bulgaria and Romania or Serbia to Hungary. This “South European Gas Pipeline (SEGP)“ or also “extended Blue Stream“ would at first transport exclusively Russian gas. It could, however, also later take Caspian gas to carry it instead of using the European Nabucco line!

In May 2007 the next attempt from Moscow to undermine the European Nabucco project followed. In Turkmenbashi the Russian President Putin met his Turkmenian and Kasahk counterparts to sign a declaration on the modernisation of the old gas pipeline existing since 1967, and the construction of a new one parallel to the first one, also along the Eastern coast of the Caspian Sea, both to be operated by Gazprom. Construction works are scheduled to start as early as mid-2008, and would thus clearly be earlier finished than Nabucco which also intends to tap on gas from Central Asia!

The last counterattack of Gazprom came in spring 2008 offering the construction of a “South Stream” pipeline stretching from Beregovaya in Southern Russia through the Black Sea to the Bulgarian harbour city Varna. From there two extensions are foreseen, a Southwestern one to Greece and then to Southern Italy, and a Northwestern through Serbia and Hungary to Northern Italy (probably through Croatia and Slovenia). Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria and recently also Greece have already signed agreements of cooperation in this project. However, the South Stream pipeline would again imply that exclusively Russian gas would be delivered thus further increasing Europe’s dependency on Russia in its energy security!

These sceptic considerations have been fuelled fiurthermore when in April 2008 Gazprom and the Italian energy enterprise ENI issued a statement that they will in future cooperate in the realization of upstream joint projects in third countries mentioning as first such attempt a gas pipeline from Lybia to Southern Italy. Gazprom thus is trying to diversify its supplies and at the same time increases its energy grip on Europe.

Under these circumstances scepticism has raised in the EU whether Nabucco still has a chance of becoming realised. Brussels has revitalised the endeavours to finalise the preparatory work and in particular to get the clear commitments of the Southeast European countries for the project. For Europe’s intended diversification of suppliers and import routes Southeast Europe remains the only new entry portal at hands. The Energy Community Treaty must be seen as the decisive step in these efforts. It provides Southeast Europe technical support and financial assistance for the overdue modernisation of its energy grids as well gives momentum to the urgently needed design of regional energy co-operation. Finally it enables the linkage to and inclusion into the EU energy network. For the EU the Treaty opens the door for future gas deliveries from three regions rich of energy resources: the Caspian Region, Central Asia and the Middle East including the Arabian Peninsula.

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