The recent floods have hit areas where the conflict between the Taliban and the alliance of the Pakistani government with the US is raging. The affected areas are mainly plains and valleys located near the mountainous region of Kafiristan/Nuristan. By contrast the mountains have been left untouched by the storm and those who fled from the plains sought refuge there. For the time being there is nothing standing in the lowlands, while there are rudimentary natural shelters in the mountains.

  In the strategically significant lowland areas, such as the Swat valley, the Taliban have attempted in the past to gain full control of the region from the Pakistani government. Before the flooding the Taliban insurgents, based in the mountains, have established networks of information, propaganda, recruitment and military equipment amongst the indigenous population to overcome the government’s control, and progressively detach the areas from the control of Islamabad.

  The conflict was being unfolded until the time the floods occurred, thus causing the complete destruction of the urban infrastructure in the region. Apart from the water there is nothing standing and the Pakistani government is trying to regain control of the area by sending humanitarian aid. The floods created a situation which the Taliban had sought to achieve militarily: a power vacuum in the affected areas.

  Due to the complete catastrophe and the failure of the Pakistani government to ensure the health of residents and to repair the damage in a short time, the growing anger of the affected Muslim inhabitants against Islamabad is expected to promote the activities of the Taliban who seek to gain from this the crisis in the ideological and operational level. Ideologically the Taliban will present the disaster to the affected residents as divine wrath, and the water as purifying power against Islamabad in the war “against the enemies of God.” To achieve the “restoration of divine order” the Taliban will require, as “soldiers of God”, every kind of support by the residents at the expense of the Pakistani government. Some people with low or no moral because of the catastrophe and the lack of governmental support will respond positively to the callings of the Taliban.

  In this case, the Taliban have the tactical advantage over Islamabad: though they have also suffered casualties in the lowlands, their forces are intact in the mountains, and the Pakistani army is absent from the lowlands. Many residents have already fled to the mountains to save themselves and they are already with the Taliban. The latter are expected to develop a network of immediate humanitarian assistance based on Islamic charity funds from secret networks of Arab countries.

  In these crucial moments the speed of humanitarian assistance is of decisive significance. Viewing Islamabad as an inadequate factor and understanding the frail balance of power in the region, Washington is rushing to provide humanitarian aid, mainly by air, and prevent the Taliban, who are already in the area and have the tactical advantage.

  Waiting to see the aftermath of the floods in the lowlands, both Islamabad-Washington and the Taliban cannot wait to see the impact of flooding on the morale of the affected population. Whether a divine wrath or a natural phenomenon, the unexpected diluvial water enriched the region geopolitically, adding new features to a long-term war.

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Read the entire article in ATHENS PLUS/ page 9

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EU foreign policy is often depicted in the literature[1] and, especially, after 9/11 as a civilian power with the charms of Venus: its impact on the modern interdependent world is based on trade and diplomacy avoiding the use of force, while its force of persuasion derives from its own internal model. Both the EUISS report and the debate in the subsequent roundtable, apart from the individual analysis of the EU role on various geographic regions (Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, Africa, Balkans, Brazil, China, Iran, Middle East, Russia and Eastern Neighbourhood Policy and the EU in the Mediterranean), focused on the nature of EU external action in the changing multipolar international arena. It was stipulated that the EU remains a civilian power, with limited use of force, always guaranteed by broad international legitimacy. The EU, as a normative power, always bases its external action on the principle of democracy, on human rights and the rule of law while, according to the EUISS Report, it is in its interests to promote the international acceptance of the concept of effective multilateralism in exercising its international role.  

From the issues raised in the recent EUISS round table discussion on the nature of EU foreign policy, two questions are identified. The first question is to examine whether it is correct the EU foreign policy to be exercised under the same (European) values (the values mentioned above) towards all geographic areas. The different conditions of each area and the fact that, under the principle of conditionality, the progress of EU external relations depends on the absorption of EU values, probably, make this approach inefficient and inflexible. The second question raised was the absence of an explicit definition, by region, of the EU interests. It was stressed that it is not enough for EU to export its principles, if it does not clarify, beforehand and explicitly, its interests to the region.

The functioning of the new institutions of the Lisbon Treaty could entail rendering EU interests explicit and in promoting them effectively. The approval of the EAES legal blueprint by the European Parliament (8/7/2010) is a historic step. The EAES, the new High Representative and the President of the European Council constitute features of EU foreign policy “brusselisation”. The impact of these institutions in the nature of the EU foreign policy can not yet be clarified. As it was stressed from officials of the forthcoming Belgian Presidency, the Treaty of Nice “era” is “closed” now, with the completion of the Spanish Presidency. Furthermore, the selection of the EAES high level officials is still pending and expected with great interest. It is yet to be seen whether the balance between small / large member-states will be respected (with the information not to be promising until now). The functioning EAES and the role of the High Representative Catherine Ashton (who, finally, may become a pleasant surprise) could alter the nature of EU foreign policy and, consequently, could also change the myth used by analysts and academics in order to depict EU external role: instead of Venus, the EU may be represented by Minerva, with its owl (wisdom) and spear (force).

[*] This article is published in Greek in the Newsletter of “European Developments” of the Institute of European Integration and Policy (IEIP) of the University of Athens.

[1] As in the recent article of Ian Manners, “Global Europa: Mythology of the European Union in World Politics”, JCMS, Volume 48, Issue 1, 2010.

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On the basis of the report[1] by the high-level group, chaired by Jacques de Larosière, last year the Commission tabled a package consisting of the creation of a European Systemic Risk Board, under the auspices of the European Central Bank, dealing with macro supervision, and also three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), dedicated to banks, financial markets and insurance companies. In addition the package contains a proposal for an “Omnibus Directive”, with changes to sectoral financial services legislation, conferring powers to the ESAs aiming at achieving a single rule book.

In December 2009, the ECOFIN council endorsed this package, accepting some progress but it has also diluted many elements: on the micro side, a horizontal “safeguard clause” (article 23) gives the Member states a strong veto right as soon as a decision made by the ESAs could “impinge in any way on the fiscal responsibility of the Member states”; the governments have also reduced the direct powers of the ESAs, in particular in case of an emergency, or if a dispute arising between national supervisors requires mediation.

The Parliament reacted rapidly; the same day of the ECOFIN meeting, a press release cosigned by the four main political groups (the popular right, the socialists, the liberals and the Greens) denounced the watering down of the Commission’s draft.

A revised version of the package has been adopted on May 10, with a broad majority, by the ECON Committee in the European Parliament.

The Parliament’s major changes to the Commission proposal, to strengthen the powers at EU level, are the following:

On the micro-prudential level the ESAs should :

-  supervise cross-border institutions that pose a systemic risk,

- have powers to issue binding decisions applicable to financial institutions in the case of a breach of EU law or dispute between national authorities.

Parliament also voted for the setting up of a European deposit guarantee fund to protect depositors and a European banking stability fund to help ailing institutions. Both shall be financed by the financial sector in order to ensure that a burden is not put on the taxpayer. ESMA should also be able to prohibit certain financial products.

On the macro-prudential level the ESRB would in addition to its task of monitoring financial markets and issuing warnings and recommendations, be in charge of declaring emergency situations.

Parliament also decided that the President of the ECB should be at the helm of the ESRB. They also made the decision to open the general board to non-central bankers, and to create a high level advisory scientific committee.

Furthermore, the Committee decided that the authorities should all be located in the same place, Frankfurt, close to the ECB in order to develop a common supervisory culture. We believe that there is a strong case for the proximity of the macro- and micro-prudential authorities.

This text, slightly amended, was passed by a significant majority in the July plenary 2010 but formally, the “first reading procedure” has not been closed.

The discussion foreseen by the co-decision procedure, between the Parliament, the Council and the Commission, is under way with the council playing further the national card and the Parliament trying to maintain a high level of ambition, for three primary  reasons:

1. Firstly, the financial services are one of Europe’s strengths; in order to consolidate our competitive advantage in this field, and in order to support the growth of our economy, the EU financial market must be transparent, sound and stable.

2. Secondly, if the cross border groups are not properly supervised, protectionism will continue to develop, putting in danger the single market. The Turner review, published by the British FSA one year ago, stressed this risk of a split that might occur within the single market if the solution would be “more national powers[2]”, as did Professor Monti in his recent report[3]: “It would be a serious mistake if the Council, under the pressure of Member States giving priority to a natural tendency to protect national supervisory competences were to favour timid solutions. These would present the risk of leading to a fragmented and more vulnerable single market”.

3.Thirdly, the EU should be capable of speaking with a stronger voice at the global level, in all the bodies dealing with finance and supervision. The US has just agreed a comprehensive bill. To be heard outside Europe, we have to simplify the decision making process and clearly identify those responsible. All governments repeat the same message at the G 20 but seem to forget it when they negotiate in Brussels.

The crisis has clearly shown the limits, for cross border groups, of parallel national supervisory systems (the Fortis case for example). Even though the Parliament has been asking for a common supervision since at least the Garcia Margallo y Marfil Report in 2000, and despite the fact that we simply cannot afford new expensive bail outs, some states in the Council, refuse any big step. However, the Council has signed and ratified the Lisbon treaty, thereby increasing the powers of the EP and broadening the scope of qualified majority voting among Member States. The world is changing rapidly. We do not need further dilution and further delay because some Member States stick to unanimity voting. The challenge for our generation, in the age of globalization, is to promote what Pascal Lamy called “La démocratie monde[4]” i.e. a new type of democracy at a supranational level, because the main problems we face, like the supervision of financial markets, are at a supranational level. This requires supra-national solutions.

The current crisis of the Euro has shown that coordination of national decisions, seen here in the ECOFIN council, does not deliver a sufficient multilateral surveillance. It has then taken more than 3 months for the European council to take the necessary decisions regarding Greece.

The EU should have more confidence in the Community method. The more the capitals believe they control the European system, the more the system is losing credibility.

[1] http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_fr.pdf

[2] The Turner Review, A regulatory response to the global banking crisis, March 2009, FSA

[3] A new strategy for the single market at the service of Europe’s economy and society. Point 2.8

[4] La démocratie monde, Editions du Seuil, 2004

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Godfrey Bloom – Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group

The concept of financial regulation across 27 countries most of whom have no experience of financial services is not just flawed but dangerous.  The United Kingdom, yes the City of London, is the only world class centre for financial services in the European Union.  This is not just a matter of fact but a situation deeply resented by other ‘wannabe’ cities who are current third division players.  Notably Paris and Frankfurt.   Regulation therefore is already being moulded not to protect the consumer but to rearrange the spheres of influence within the EU.  No surprise therefore that Paris and Frankfurt have muscled in the division of the regulatory ‘spoils’.

Admittedly London has brought much of this on itself.  I was a member of the bogus Frances Maud’s ‘consultative group’ in 1986 when the first Financial Services Act was mooted in the United Kingdom.  I say bogus because as always with politicians, consultation means nothing of the sort.  It means diktat of the political knee jerk brigade when something has gone wrong.  In this case a failure of an obscure company called Barlow Clowes.

The sort of regulation that followed was totally prescriptive.  A box ticking exercise, doomed to failure in the fast moving world of financial services.  It was prescriptive largely because the regulatory services did not understand the concept of any alternative.  The stepping stones to collapse are plain to see from the record.  United Kingdom Providence Institution, London Life, Split Caps, National Provident Institution, Equitable Life, Northern Rock and others.  Since 1986 London has seen various different regulators.  IMRO, LAUTRO, FIMBRA, PIA, FSA and others.  Gordon Brown constructed the FSA stuffed it with box tickers led by chums of number 10 Downing Street on monster salaries usually with some sort of honour to accompany it.  In the UK Lordships and Knighthoods impress waiters and are much sought after.

This absurd approach to regulating an industry which contributed 40% of the UK’s GDP of course ended in disaster.  No apologies though, in May the FSA awarded themselves a 10% salary increase and a15% bonus.  The traditional bizarre reward for failure much loved by the British establishment.

The European Union, desperately jealous and ever hungry for control of all it surveys, was quick to pounce.  We now have a system so guaranteed to fail companies are fleeing the City as I write.

Why must it fail?  The reasons are many fold.  Once must remember that everything the EU manages fails.  Agriculture, Fishing, Energy, Employment legislation, Immigration, the list is endless.  But let us suppose this history of failure is broken by a miraculous success in financial services, what pointers do we already have?

The Commissioners are hostile to laissez faire capitalism and in particular an entrepreneurial approach to international financial services.  The EU is the ultimate “control freak” organization.  Money is less easy to control than people.  It annoys the institution.  Hence the manic drive for tax harmonization.  They hold that all countries should steal exactly the same amount of tax from their citizens so no sensible, thrifty, small government administration triumphs over their incompetence, corruption and prolifigacy.

This is not a secret.  In my capacity as Coordinator for the Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group I questioned three of the Commissioner-designates who will have responsibility for financial regulation.  Those interviews are recorded on my website I will not detail them here, but notwithstanding their urbane political performances, their intellectual hostility to financial services was there in varying degrees.  It is not generally known in the slowly arousing City of London that 15 of the 27 Commissioners including the President are self confessed communists, Marxists and socialists.  No apology for it, again see my website.

It is important to bear in mind not all banks floundered in the recent crisis.  The old British Dominion banks all survived intact.  Why?  Because they have a completely different system of regulation.  Nothing much to do with boxes administered by clerks and second rate lawyers.  In fact a consumer friendly system of complete transparency so the concept of caveat emptor is guided on to the target.  The only safe system of consumer protection in financial services.  A fool and his money are soon parted is not just a British homily.

Again, see my website, when I put this point to Monsieur Barnier he dismissed my suggestion we adopt their system because “Australia is a long way away”.  I think the recording on my website shows my jaw drop at this astonishing piece of stupidity.  When I got cross I was warned in the corridors by a member of the British Conservative Party that I was in danger of ‘rocking the boat’!

So we have learned nothing from the recent experience from hell.  We are to have more of the same.  Monsieur Barnier, suave, charming, ill informed (he does not believe in commodity trading or selling short, see that web) supervising the Gilbertian absurd Lord Turner who would clearly prefer to be doing something else.

Already the EU is spewing regulation on Alternative Investment Managers.  There is a school of thought Hedge Funds caused the banking crisis, Investment Trusts should be covered by the same regulations.  Risk in banking should be avoided.  Banking is risk.  Risk reward is the ultimate financial service.  It is as though an Oxford Classics Don has been asked to write a pop critique for Now Musical Express.

The British Motorcycle Industry, once thought unassailable disappeared in the early 60s.  The City of London could go the same way. The French of course would enjoy the schadenfreude until they realised the City of London is their golden goose.  The French farmers’ begging bowl will remain empty if the Parisian financial service industry try and take over from London.  Those Iberian peninsula motorways have to be paid for.  The Germans cannot fund the entire shibboleth on their own.

I predict, unless there is a rapid change of direction, the UK financial services industry will go the way of our motorcycle, fishing and steel industry.  Who will benefit?  Ironically no one in the EU.  Zurich, New York, Chicago and Hong Kong.  Where will the great and good be?  Well, be sure of one thing the Barniers and Turners of the world won’t be going hungry.  But they will almost certainly be ‘unavailable for comment’.

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The supervisory package currently under consideration and based on the conclusions of the de Larosière group constitutes an important step ahead. However, further steps will be needed for the future structure of EU supervision if we want to avoid crises in future by enhancing financial stability and investor protection ensure that the financial markets are geared towards long term investment.

To me, a key lesson to be drawn from the financial crisis is that national financial supervision was unable to oversee increasingly globalised markets. Globalisation without the appropriate regulation and supervision created incentives favouring financial markets over real economy, and short term profits over long-term investment, driven by shareholder value and excluding the social partners and end-users such as SME’s and consumers. This gave way to weak, opaque and inherently unstable balance sheets of large financial institutions which were ever more under pressure to find larger profits.

To overcome this situation, a strong European Financial Supervision System with binding powers is needed, notably for cross-border institutions. Moreover, the future supervisory framework should aim not only at guaranteeing financial stability, but also at protecting the investor. Therefore, in the context of the current supervisory package, I have been calling for the new European securities market authority (ESMA) to be given the task to register financial innovation products as prototypes, to authorise their selling on the market, to monitor them and to ban them if necessary.

This could be a first step towards a “twin peaks” model of supervision, which I believe to be the most appropriate solution for the future. It would consists in a single authority for the supervision of the banking and insurance sector, operating under the auspices of the ECB, and another one for securities and consumer protection. In this framework, the ECB would be in charge of macro-prudential supervision and of co-supervising the large cross-border financial institutions. The crisis showed that micro-supervison is not sufficient considering the aggregation of risks stemming from all parts of the economy and the financial markets. Therefore the role of the ECB in such a future framework would be of utmost importance.

In parallel, national supervisors need to be reinforced in their capacity to do their job at national level and in confidence with the EU authorities.

Furthermore, it is of crucial importance to find coordinated solutions to crisis resolution of cross-border institutions in the EU. In this regard, I welcome the Commission’s Communication on EU crisis resolution. This requires a high level of harmonisation of national resolution mechanisms and of insolvency rules in order to ensure that the system works properly. It also supposes setting up key principles for burden sharing among Member States. The idea of establishing a European resolution fund should be welcomed in this regard and should be linked to a living wills exercise for all institutions across Europe. I also believe that the new EU supervisory architecture should engage in harmonising and developing the practice of stress tests.

If financial markets are to be designed at the service of the real economy, it is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of incentives towards the long-term horizon and that the costs in case of crisis are borne by shareholders and creditors, and not by taxpayers, while ensuring financial stability and the continuity of services to users. This requires to take all stakeholders on board and not to be caught in a “tête à tête” between regulators and the industry which necessarily end up in a biased and short-sighted approach. Supervision is not just about an abstract architecture, it needs to open-up to new profiles and to broaden its scope such as to monitor issues such as corporate governance and remunerations.

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Nikolaos Chountis – Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left

After the stock market and oil crisis in 1970s, the world economic system in general, and the financial system in particular, were based on three “pillars”: a) the collapse of the fixed exchange rates system, b) the internationalization and liberalization of financial markets and c) the development of derivatives and other financial tools.

Since the early 80s, we are witnessing the integration of the financial sector in the EU, which was based on the neoliberal globalization, namely, the abolition of national controls and barriers to the movements of capital, the privatization of banks and other financial institutions (e.g. insurance companies), the assignment of central financial functions, such as, credit risk assessment, definition of accounting standards, etc., to private organizations, and the lack of a European system of regulation and supervision.

In the last meeting of the European Council (18-19 June 2009) was decided the establishment of two new regulatory bodies, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS). Although that decision was in the right direction, the shaping of the new institutions was based on the premise of the “primacy of the markets”, a fact that limited their scope.

In particular, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was established under the auspices of the European Central Bank (ECB), and it is composed of 1) the Central Bankers from the 27 member countries of the EU, 2) the European Commission representatives, and 3) the President and Vice-President of the ECB. Please note that the supervisory and financial authorities of member countries participate only as observers, ie without voting rights. The ESRB does not have any legal personality.

The ESRB’s responsibilities include: managing information on developments in the economy and the financial sector, identify and analyze potential threats to financial stability, issuing warnings and make recommendations for regulatory measures, coordinating with international organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  In the absence of implementation of its recommendations, the ESRB may refer to the Council of the EU, and make public warnings. Finally, it is required to submit monthly reports to the Council and Parliament.

Unlike the ESRB, the European System of Financial Supervisors refers to the upgrading of the three existing committees at the European level– regarding the banking sector, the investment companies and insurance companies, respectively – which were established in 2005 and 2006 under the “Financial Services Action Plan”, and they provide technical support to the Commission. The Committees are made up of representatives of the national supervisory authorities of member countries of the EU.

These committees are acquiring a legal personality (European Supervisory Authorities – ESA) and their own resources, and will be able to take decisions on the basis of the majority principle, leaving aside the consensus so far needed. Their responsibilities include the enhancing of the coherence of the surveillance of member countries of, the strengthening of the surveillance of cross-border groups, the oversight of credit rating agencies and the development of a single European ‘rulebook’. Finally, the ESA are required to submit monthly reports to the Council and the European Parliament.

In practice, for the issue of financial regulation, there are two different and conflictual positions. The first supports the ‘free market’ premise and the relaxation of any rules that regulate the financial sector, while the second argues that the current economic crisis dictate us to “put an end” to speculative financial markets. The framework of this conflict has been based on the functions and powers that these regulatory “pillars” will have, and how they will effectively regulate an ever-growing market.

For the Left, the financial sector has been dangerously increased in magnitude and significance, related to the real economy, while the competition between hedge funds, banks and other financial institutions leads to more volatility and risk. The EU, in addition to the financial regulatory system, must develop a concrete, strict, uniform throughout the EU and effective set of rules, in order to monitor the activities of the financial sector. The proposed regulatory authorities, however, have been left without any effective power, in the sense that Member States will be responsible for the specific rules governing the financial sector. On the other hand, there might be the possibility of a new kind of competition based on financial regulation, where financial capitals will choose the country with the more relaxed regulatory framework. Thus, while the Commission’s initiative to regulate the financial sector is, in principle, positive, we must admit that the success is extremely limited, due to the attachment of the European Commission to these economic axioms that led us to the crisis.

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Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou – Group of the European People’s Party

The end of this decade coincided with an enormous financial crisis, whose epicentre was the financial sector. Many would argue that all the mess that was brought forward because of the globalization of the markets could have been avoided, or at least its effects been mitigated, should there was a mechanism to foresee the symptoms. And, just because of the global dimension of the markets, such a mechanism should be able to go further than the national borders of each member-state.

In the European Union a debate has started about the necessity of a reform in the financial markets, which would allow for an establishment of a more effective framework for financial supervision within the EU, adapted to the level of financial market integration. This framework should be able to enhance financial stability in the European Union and, as a consequence, contain potential risks to the real economy and to public finances. Under such an approach, this system would safeguard the interests of consumers, investors, and other users and stakeholders of financial services, or at least prevent the magnitude of the effects of a potential crisis. Eventually it would demonstrate increased competitiveness for the European Union financial markets, and foster their integration, supporting their sustainable development.

The four new mechanisms that are about to be created should help reaching this goal. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) is expected to overlook the robustness of the European financial system, and therefore of the European economies, as it will be able to timely identify aggregated imbalances in the system. On the other hand, the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, and the European Securities and Markets Authority are respectively expected to work closely with the national bodies, in order to bring about any potential threat that would endanger the financial system.

Moreover, a proposal of controlling the Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM), which includes hedge funds, private equity funds, and real estate funds is on the pipeline. They will have to register in their member state, prove they have competent managers and structure, submit to audits and meet minimum capital requirements.

Of course, such an enormous change in the way the financial markets work, would not come without some serious opposing opinions. In the European Union, there are a number of member states and stakeholders that see these new instruments with scepticism, as a significant part of their economic growth relies on the financial sector. There are voices that argue that such steps will stifle the industry, or even force it out of the Union. Not to mention the number of jobs and the tax revenues that are in jeopardy, should the changes take place.

All the aforementioned authorities will not be required to monitor the entire market, but rather the entities that play a systemic role, in other words the companies that could pose significant threats to the market should they actually face any kind of problems. This approach should create the dynamics for a coordination of the regulations throughout the European Union, a move closer to an open, single market.

The European Parliament has formed a common ground, which seems to satisfy, more or less, all the involving parts. In the coming July we will have our proposal voted. We hope that the Council will conclude to a common position and have a successful compromise. In this case, by the beginning of 2011 these new mechanisms will be ready and operational.

What we need to understand is that in the future there will be no place for fragmented, national responses, with a lesser effect to the globalized markets, but rather a single and clear answer to external risks.

The road is open, after the creation of these authorities, to further elaborate their role to national and EU-wide level. They could potentially have the power to enforce common procedures and rules, or even prohibit of certain risky financial products from being traded in organized markets. They could even potentially help national bodies with direct intervention to the market, by taking over supervision of specific institutions. There is a great debate regarding the future role and efficiency of these authorities but, as in most of the cases, we will have to see how they will be able to interact with and provide assistance to the national markets, before we come up to specific conclusions.

Are all these measures going to put an end to the financial instability and surprises? We can definitely rule out such an option. But what we can achieve, is to alleviate the results of such crises, so that they don’t take the whole economy down, bringing national budgets to their knees, as we are witnessing in Europe these days. And most importantly, we can show that the European Union has the reflections to respond to situations that threaten its peoples’ welfare.

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