In order to address this issue, a key point seems to be the type of heavy weaponry that Syrian rebels either have or could acquire in the foreseeable future. Judging from the progressively intensive fighting, it is obvious that the rebels get stronger and stronger; for instance they have managed recently to shoot down a military jet and a helicopter. According to some information they have been equipped, via Turkey mostly, with surface-to-air missiles. Could they be given more sophisticated and heavier weapons in order to consolidate their position and acquire an advantage in the battlefield? Given the current circumstances it is quite difficult because of the rebels’s lack of high military expertise, and the ability of Damascus to carry its military personnel and equipment very easily from various military bases to wherever necessary each time.

In recent weeks it has become clear to Washington that unless a no-fly zone is imposed in Syria, it will be highly unlikely that the rebels could reinforce their positions. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that, given the current situation, time is ticking out for the rebels because their modus operandi does not ensure a positive outcome of their efforts. As a result, their morale is already being rested (there have been protests on the rebel side that the West is not doing enough to help them) and it will be tested further in the forthcoming weeks. Contrary to Assad who has managed to retain his stamina and the unity amongst his supporters, despite occasional defections of politicians and military personnel, the deterioration of the rebels’s morale could become fatal for their efforts to topple Assad.

Having these in mind, the ongoing discussions in the West to establish one or more buffer zones aim to strengthen the morale of the Syrian opposition. Such a prospect would presuppose necessarily the imposition of a no-fly zone and if this development takes place, then it could be a turning point in the Syrian Civil War. But establishing a buffer zone entails high risks for the security of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, given the active involvement of these countries (including Iran and Saudi Arabia) in Syria, and in this case the Syrian civil war may turn to a regional war with unpredictable developments. This is the take it or leave it challenge that Washington is facing now and, in order to get out of it, bold decisions are necessary for the Obama administration. Yet given the fact that the US elections are in sight, there might be a decision of keeping things on the ground as such for another two months. If so, the morale of the rebels is expected to deteriorate further. In the meantime the lives of more and more Syrians will be at stake…

The transformation of Nabucco to a far less ambitious project that is effectively tailor-made to meet the needs of the Shah Deniz partners while disregarding the needs of potential suppliers from the Middle East (and most probably Turkmenistan) was not an automatic process. There have been significant tensionsand disagreements between the Nabucco partners as SOCAR and Botas championed the idea of the TANAP pipeline which basically replaced the Asiatic component of the original Nabucco but simultaneously annulled any realistic prospect for the medium-term export of Iraqi –or more precisely- Kurdish gas from the Khor Mor and Chemchemal fields that are currently developed by Nabucco leaders OMV and MOL.

Despite these tensions as SOCAR became more and more adamant in securing the leading role in the TANAP project, Nabucco was left with no real option but to adjust to SOCAR’s requirements as another leading Shah Deniz member, BP, was aggressively championing the rival South East European Pipeline or SEEP. SEEP, whose regulatory and financial details were never fully detailed, initially appeared as a strong competitor to Nabucco given BP’s backing and the fact that it aspired to utilize pre-existing pipeline infrastructure, such as the Interconnectors between Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Hungary, that would have been commissioned throughout S.E. Europe by 2015.

Some observers indicated that the vagueness of SEEP’s technical details were deliberate since the entire project was in effect a Shah Deniz stratagem to force Nabucco’s compliance to the needs of SOCAR and its other Shah Deniz partners that are developing in partnership with the Azeri NOC (National Oil Company) other very promising acreage in Azerbaijan’s offshore sector, like the Absheron (Total), Umid/Babek (SOCAR), AGC Deep (BP) and Shafag / Asiman (BP) fields. The potential exports of these fields should be given absolute priority over uncertain flows of natural gas that emanated from volatile areas like Kurdish Iraq and Turkmenistan were none of the abovementioned SD partners have any major upstream presence.

Even though SEEP’s obscurity was deliberate and–in combination with TANAP’s emergence- did make the downsizing of Nabucco practically inevitable, the principal reason behind SEEP’s demise may be found in the fact that it never aspired to link SEEP with a major European hub. SEEP’s principal target was to divide the 10 bcm/y of the Shah Deniz gas almost equally between the five principal Balkan consumers (Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Serbia) and might have left the option of increasing its scalability to another 10 bcm/y in order to reach Baumgarten after Shah Deniz 2 exports had been sold out. In effect SEEP appears to have violated one of Shah Deniz’s principal selection criteria, namely that the selected infrastructure should be nearly automatically scalable to export another 10 bcm/y of future Azeri export capacity.

These additional 10 bcm/y, which may not be available before 2025, cannot be absorbed by the aforementioned five Balkan states and would have to be transported in toto to Baumgarten. Nabucco-West (Nab-West) offers both options and does not stop at the Austrian-Hungarian border, as SEEP’s latest draft routing suggested. Nabucco proposes to sell 4-5 bcm/y to Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary while transporting the remaining 5-6 bcm/y to Baumgarten at a cost which is still unspecified. On 29 June Reinhard Mitscheck, the project’s CEO noted in a press conference following the announcement of Nab-West’s selection the day before, that “Nabucco delivers freedom of choice to gas consumers and will contribute considerably to the security of supply in Europe” but of course did not disclose the actual cost of the scaled-down 1.312-km line. What he did stress though is that Nabucco has already in place a strong “legal framework with Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, it [Nabucco] also has European commission’s support” Moreover, Mitscheck emphasized “Nabucco West can transport gas not only to onefinancial market, but to all Europe”.

Mitscheck was indirectly referring to what may prove to be TAP’s Achilles ‘Heel: the lack of an Intergovernmental Agreement between Greece, Albania and Italy that would facilitate the granting of all the necessary environmental and Third-Party Access permits. Even though Mitscheck appears to be undervaluing the significance of the Italian market as a major consumer of Azeri gas as well as Italy’s ability to act as a transit state towards Switzerland and more importantly France, Total’s “home market”, he has a salient point when illustrating the support Nabucco has been getting from the European Commission.

EU Energy Commissioner Gunther Oettinger was quick to commend Shah Deniz on its decision by noting that Nab-West’s selection “represented a success for Europe and for our security of supply”. The Commission’s dedicated endorsement of Nabucco is the principal reason why the continued absence of an IGA agreement between TAP’s “Host Governments” may prove to be detrimental to the project’s chances, despite the fact that it is considerably more attractive than Nab-West from a financial and commercial point of view. TAP has access to a major scalable market in Italy that is also very well connected with all Central and Western European markets in Germany, Switzerland and France.

It should be noted though that Nab-West’ selections seems to have altered the mind of MOL, which has effectively announced its decision to withdraw from Nabucco in May 2012 and still (c.c. late June 2012) has not paid its share (€3 million) of the consortium’s 2012 budget of €18 million. On 2 July 2012, MOL’s spokesman, Domokos Szollar, told DowJones that “This [SD’s selection] could bring an end to the long period of uncertainty resulted from the infeasibility of the original Nabucco plan” adding that the decision in favor of Nab-West confirmed MOL’s calculation that the original concept “wasn’t sustainable”.

It is still unclear whether Nabucco’s finances would make sense in the long-term as TAP’s shareholders’ composition changes to include major global, European and regional players that would only increase the pipeline’s commerciality. TAP’s financial and commercial merits seem to have secured it a key ally that may eventually tip the scale in its favor vis-à-vis Nab-West. On 27 June Al Cook, BPʹs Vice‐President for Shah Deniz (SD) Development, told Dow Jones the SD operator, which owns along with Statoil 25.5% of the consortium, had “in principle” completed negotiations to join TAP and “to help provide funding in the short term.” He added that BP’s participation “will be substantial… We will demonstrate that we are very serious about the success [of TAP].”

It is not yet clear how the shareholders composition of TAP would emerge as both the Italian and Greek governments are reviewing their strategies in order to exchange the signing of an IGA with Albania with the participation of Greek and Italian companies in TAP. BP’s share may even be higher than the present participation (15%) of E.ON in the TAP consortium and may even exceed 20%. However, a share of 20% may be the most likely compromise since the TAP partners are also looking to bring in an Italian and a Greek company. TAP executives have been negotiating with Italy’s Enel and Greece’s M&M over a combined share of 20‐30%. Enel is thought likely to ask for 15‐20%, whereas the Greek gas trader is expected to seek 5‐10%. It is also clear that the Italian government may demand the inclusion of ENI, Italy’s national oil and gas company, which has a leading upstream position in Kazakhstan’s major producing gas field in Karachaganak.

BP’s announcement will likely precipitate the talks between TAP, Enel, ENI and M&M. The Italian government is increasingly keen on TAP following a rejection in June 2012 of the revised Interconnector Turkey‐Greece‐Italy (ITGI) proposal by the Shah Deniz partners.  Mr Cook said BP’s decision to invest in TAP “was partially motivated by the changing regulatory and economic outlook in Italy.” Italy’s increased regulatory flexibility is an indication that Rome has fully abandoned ITGI. It is still unclear what the policy of the new Greek government will be, with former DEPA President Makis Papageorgiou being sworn in last week as Deputy Minister of Energy. Mr. Papageorgiou is perceived as a supporter of the IGI/Poseidon component of ITGI, which was established during his tenure at state gas utility DEPA in 2008.

The 17 June 2012 elections have resulted in a divided structure of power within the Greek Ministry of Energy where the top job landed in the hands of a non-elected University Professor of Cartography, Dr. Evangelos Livieratos who is a personal choice of PASOK’s President and former Finance Minister Evangelos Venizelos.  It is not yet clear what would be the division of powers between Livieratos, Papageorgiou and Stavros Kalafatis, a Nea Demokratia (New Democracy) MP that served as Deputy Development Minister at the previous Karamanlis government (2007-2009). Kalafatis who was Nea Demokratia’s shadow energy minister up to the 6 May elections, was appointed Alternate Minister of Energy, the second most powerful executive position within the Ministry.

At the same time, however, I could not but be sceptical for the future of Greek-German relations. The need itself for the organisation of a conference with journalists from Greece and Germany confirms the existing misunderstanding between the two countries and can hardly be considered as positive for the project of European integration. Ironically, at the time I received the invitation by Südosteuropa Gesellschaft , I was participating in the Halki International Seminar of ELIAMEP aiming at facilitating co-operation between young journalists from Kosovo and Serbia!

In any case, we can’t go back in time. As Greek-German relations have already deteriorated, what we need to do is not only to look at the past and express our regret for their current status but also to systematically work on their improvement. This said the initiative of  Südosteuropa Gesellschaft is a remarkable one. Difficult as it is it can certainly provide a basis for an open dialogue between representatives of the two countries who have played an important role since October 2009.

There is no question that the media in both sides have sometimes exaggerated in their coverage. But their impact has specific limits. In my view, political elites are the driving force behind the current ‘hostility’. On the one hand, Greek politicians seem to prefer agreeing to things imposed from abroad for which they can then shift the blame, rather than coming up with a domestic agenda for which they take ownership and responsibility. And, on the other one, German politicians have been ready to push for solutions and then shove responsibility onto the Greeks.

I am almost sure that if German and Greek politicians start to closely cooperate and – in the case of the Hellenic Republic – deliver, the media will follow. My understanding after taking part in the Munich forum is that journalists from both sides are prepared to work together while some of them have already started to do so. Nevertheless, their job is to cover the news. In so doing, they are naturally encountered – almost every day – with factors such as the credibility deficit of Greek politicians and the insistence of German ones on almost unrealistic targets. This is the key finding of the fruitful dialogue held in Munich under the auspices of Südosteuropa Gesellschaft.

Mursi’s main focus is on the domestic political scene without ignoring the regional challenges he faces. Actually his decisions on important issues such as the Palestinian cause, Egypt-Israel relations as well as Cairo’s ties with key regional countries in Islamic terms, such as Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia are expected to influence the public opinion in Egypt and enable him further to increase his role and proceed to domestic reforms. Mursi’s foreign policy has a single aim: to make Egypt the political centre of the Islamic world. Mursi’s Islamic foreign policy is expected to support Hamas actively and deal favorably with the Palestinians regarding Raffah. He will minimize relations with Israel and expand relations primarily with Turkey, and less with Iran, although Mursi will probably re-initiate actively Iran-Egypt diplomatic relations.

Reform is the keyword in regard to Mursi’s future domestic policy which constitutes the core of his presidency. Mursi came to power in order to change entirely or partially the secular character of Egypr’s political system. The Islamization and democratization of politics and society is a desideratum for the Islamic Brotherhood. Yet the Islamists know well that in order to be successful they must take control of the army and intelligence which currently are under the military. Apparently Mursi is at the very beginning of a long struggle between the army and the Islamists for the essential control of the country. Whether he is successful or not, it will depend on how influential he can be in the middle ranks of the military. The situation resembles very much that of Erdogan’s struggle with the Turkish military and Mursi is going to emulate some of the techniques of the Islamist Turks. Yet the situation in Egypt is very different given that Egypt has not undergone the secularization process of the middle-urban class in the same degree and extent that Turkey has. This means that the Islamic Brotherhood, regardless of the moderate profile of its top leaders, is expected to act more radically than it has done so far. If so, then the struggle with the military is going to be intense and painful for everyone in Egypt.

It is evident that Mursi’s election as the new president of Egypt will not have essential repercussions for the domestic and foreign policy of Egypt, unless Mursi is able to compromise currently with the military. Such a compromise will be evident in every act and decision of Mursi who will be tested every day in an effort to find the middle ground in a state where everything takes place under the watchful eye of the military. If Mursi fails to compromise, then he will be out of the picture one way or another.

Some prominent Turkish scholars support openly the idea that a genocide against the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire indeed took place; among them, Taner Akşam[2] and Hamit Bozarslan[3] can be mentioned; however, this is not the mainstream approach of this issue in Turkey; in spite of the efforts made by more progressive segments of Turkish society, the Armenian genocide remains still more or less a taboo issue. This approach influences also the Turkish foreign policy, when it comes to the official recognition of the genocide; Turkish governments have displayed most of the times a very bitter reaction against countries or international organizations willing to recognize the genocide.

As it is evident, the issue is not purely a historical one; on the contrary, it has serious political and diplomatic implications. For the time being, it should be considered difficult to expect any dramatic changes in the Turkish mainstream approach towards the Armenian genocide issue. In any other case, this would mean to challenge a very strongly founded perception of the historical facts of this period, supported by many scientific essays written by Turkish as well as by foreign scholars; besides, there is also a very intense sentimental approach towards such a potential recognition: in case of recognizing the Armenian genocide, it would be very easy to link it with the holocaust, meaning, the extermination of the Jewish people by the Nazis, during World War II. As it can be seen, this issue is closely related with Turkish national conscience.

On the other hand, the Armenian issue is still causing problems in contemporary Turkish foreign policy; apart from the relations with Armenia or the countries of the European Union, there is also another major point: the Armenian issue is a serious obstacle in the “Neo – Ottoman” foreign policy; it is very difficult for Ankara to convince about its potential geostrategic role in the broader area, while having such an important problem unresolved. In any case, in a “lose – lose” situation, usually the less negative option is to be chosen; and in this case, reducing the foreign policy perspectives seems as a much better choice than to be faced with a possible national identity crisis.

[1] Erik J. Zürcher, Turkey. A Modern History, I.B. Tauris &Co Ltd., London – New York, 1993, pp. 119 – 121

[2] Taner Akşam, A Shameful Act : The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2006 and From Empire to Republic : Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide, Zed Books, 2004

[3] Hamit Bozarslan, Histoire de la Turquie Contemporaine, La Decouverte, Paris, 2004.

The Greek people wanted and want the euro. At a high cost, clearly. But not at any cost.

The electoral success of SYRIZA – only 2.8% behind New Democracy (ND) – is both a worrying and a useful phenomenon. The fact that a once fringe party, struggling to surpass the 3% threshold to get in the parliament now emerged as the most dynamic force of the Greek political system, incrementally increasing its electoral power in 6 months effectively from  4.5% to 27% is one worthy of serious contemplation and analysis. Clearly, its agenda is the main explanation for the SYRIZA phenomenon: an Anti-Memorandum, anti-establishment, anti-politics in effect party, which promises few unwelcome reforms for the many and many unwelcome reforms for the few. However, the fair counter-argument that over-taxing the flailing Greek firms is likely to lead to more unemployment in the private sector worked, this time. The issue is that if more and more people feel that there’s no future for Greece in the Eurozone of German-led MoU’s, SYRIZA’s vague semi-Communist ‘tax the rich’ proposals and ‘programme’ will gain that party an overwhelming majority in the parliament.

Its simple – the MoU’s are ‘killing’ the parties supporting them. Anti-Memorandum parties sustained and increased their power in these elections. The far-right ‘Independent Greeks’, the neo-fascist/neo-nazi Golden Dawn, and SYRIZA are three parties betting on the failure of the current anti-crisis strategies and the failure of the emerging ND-PASOK-DIMAR coalition. This is an issue as far as reforms are concerned – they will be resisted vigorously in streets and parliament (even violently). At the same time, these parties, and especially SYRIZA, will be an advantage, the negotiating asset in the Eurogroup meetings and EU negotiations ahead. Angela Merkel, together with the Finnish, Dutch, Austrian and Slovene colleagues of hers must know by now that the nightmare of political instability is not far away – the fascist influence (who are openly nostalgic of the Metaxa’s and the 1967-1974 Juntas) are a disgrace for Greece and an embarrassment for Europe – as it is as much a product of Greek history as it is of European policies and style of intra-EU, and intra-eurozone especially, negotiations. It is the perceived iron-fist response to a corrupt political elite, a skewed political system, a dysfunctional state – which can not even guarantee the security of its citizens, an exploitative economic elite and an unfavourable European context which seems to disregard the interests and prosperity of the Greek people prioritizing debt-repayment and the security of banks and interest groups over the security of Greek and European citizens. Either Europe will change the page of history now and move ahead to integrate further in terms of its politico-economic structures – as once envisaged by Monnet, Duchene and Mundell, or the page of history will put Europe on its list of incomplete and/or failed projects. The risk of disintegration at a very high cost has never been greater.

The Troika will come to Greece very soon – it must be ready for major breakthroughs and revisions. Similarly, the new government must be ready for the swift and efficient implementation of far-reaching structural reforms, simplification of the legal and bureaucratic structures, frameworks and transaction costs. The political cost will be high indeed, but possible failure – in terms of economic collapse during the term of the coalition will leave no hope to ND and PASOK especially to see their joint percentages dominating the Greek political scene again in the future. Interestingly, this government seems to be emerging as Greece’s best hope and with, unexpectedly, good odds of success. If this administration plays its cards right and Europe accommodates accordingly, Greece has good chances of making it. The ‘Hollande momentum’ needs to be capitalised. PASOK’s leader Evangelos Venizelos and his relationship with the French President is an asset, and so is Venizelos’ perception in Europe (but also in ND and DIMAR) as a skilful politician with an unchallengeable commitment to Greece’s future in Europe and the euro. Samaras’ (ND) asset is that he has been the winner of last Sunday’s elections and may prove an effective negotiator given that he was the ‘father’ of the ‘re-negotiation’ line having included such a clause in his letter to the Troika committing to honour Greece’s obligations in the near future back in 2011. Lastly, DIMAR and Fotis Kouvelis are valuable in adding legitimacy and, crucially, a ‘left’ legitimacy (counterbalancing, mitigating or at least partly diffusing SYRIZA’s influence). Kouvelis’ DIMAR can serve as an explanation to groups once connected (wrongly and clientellistically) to ND and PASOK as to why this new government will have to put an end to their imperviousness to reforms and measures.

Using SYRIZA as a negotiating card is important, but not as important as a domestic strategy for growth. Greece’s new government, together with all willing (serious and democratic) social and political movements, members of the academia and related technocrats must design an informed, realistic and representative Greek model of economic development and sustainable growth. Once this feat is completed, the European-Greek ‘Growth Pact’ will not be far away. But if Greece continues to rely on German/Troika-led dictums alone, we all know that there’s no future for Greece and its people. The recipe does not work, and if the cook remains bad and un-innovative, then the news are bad, primarily for Greece, but also for other crisis countries, the Eurozone and for the EU.

*This article was initially published as an Op-Ed with Pravda (Sk), 20.06.12.

The action of expelling Syrian diplomats from some western capitals aimed to criticize the Syrian government for the Houla massacre, albeit Damascus has officially denied responsibility for the event. The main recipient of their action was the public opinion and the message was that these governments support human rights actively. Besides human rights forms the ideological context within which Western intervention in domestic Syrian politics takes place. So far so good but is that all? Apparently not.

The move of withdrawing diplomats of some of the western allies resembles that of the decision made more than a year ago in the case of Libya. Maybe it is too early too presume that there is a plan of some Western countries to cut off all diplomatic ties with Damascus. Yet for the time being there are signs that there is an effort to deteriorate the diplomatic status. Recent past, with regard to the US-Syrian relations, has shown that such moves could be excessive diplomatic measures which can be annulled later on. This back-and-forth game could be the game this time too. However the growing intensity of the Syrian civil war in terms of time and operations suggests that the western policy vis-à-vis Assad is going to worsen in the short term. Thus the aforementioned diplomatic move could be part of a wider Western effort to stop gradually considering Damascus as the only official representative of Syria and accept a united Syrian opposition as an equally official interlocutor for the West. Whether this Western effort is going to bear fruits depends on future developments in the battleground.

Recent developments in Greek politics are giving us a glimpse into the future. The Greek political system has been strained beyond its breaking point by the exigencies of its international commitments. As a result of increasing fiscal and supply-side conditionality and complex policy interdependence, the dimensionality of electoral competition has dwindled. The scope for unilateral political action has shrunk to such an extent that political rhetoric has been greatly polarized around stark political dilemmas between pro- and anti- Europeanism, pro- and anti- austerity, populism and realism, democracy and technocracy. The electoral shift towards extremist and radical parties (e.g., the extreme right-wing Golden Dawn party witnessed a meteoric rise in its vote share from less than 1% to 7%) provides clear evidence of the radicalization of Greek politics, a natural consequence of the unprecedented economic recession (the country experiencing its fifth successive year of negative growth).

Some have been making the argument that the early elections were ill-timed and that Greece should have followed a purely technocratic approach in the form of a Monti-like government with a clear medium-term reformist agenda. In fact, the experiment of the Papademos government, bestowed with a very narrow mandate and a limited time horizon, proved relatively successful in the fulfillment of its mission, namely the completion of the debt restructuring and bailout negotiations in 2012. Yet, it remained shackled in its reform capacity by the existing political configuration of powers and the heavy politicization of the state apparatus. Simply put, the antecedent conditions for stable non-partisan technocratic rule were not there. The last parliamentary elections in 2009 took place at a time when the full extent of the crisis had not been widely publicized; the Papandreou government had not been voted into office with an explicit austerity mandate. As a result, it resorted to fickle policies and sporadic measures of fiscal adjustment, plagued by a distinct lack of democratic legitimacy and true political will for reform. The waning two-party system was not able to overcome the opposition of deep-rooted institutional actors, client groups, and favored constituencies eager to defend the status quo till its last throes. This paralyzing misalignment of the political system with popular will and the need for a renewed political agenda had to be brought to light and democratically expressed at the ballot.

However, the pro-European reflexes of the Greek electorate cannot be refuted by the latest electoral results. The overall commitment to the Union remains a mainstream political orientation in the country (the Greek Communist Party and the Golden Dawn party being the only ones openly calling for exit from Europe). The impending electoral reform towards higher proportionality and the democratic purge of entrenched political elites (around 180 out of 300 recently elected MPs are first-timers) seem to usher in a new era of ideologically compact parties, unstable post-electoral coalitions, and ill-defined coalition pacts. The specter of continued ungovernability will tend to force parties into uneasy coalitions with weak reformist mandates. The reform capacity of the country will thus remain subject to speculation.

The polarizing rhetoric of the latest electoral contest gave vent to much popular frustration over a range of issues, such as debt restructuring, unemployment, and immigration policy, that fall beyond the nation-state’s problem-solving capacity. All mainstream party platforms evoked the use of supranational policy instruments and rested on dubious assumptions about the outcomes of future intergovernmental negotiations. The people were thus made crudely aware of the limits of their national democratic system in providing sound and credible answers to the hardships of their everyday life. Such deep frustration gave rise to social unrest, civil disobedience, and of late political anti-systemic radicalization.

It is thus that Greece may be viewed as a harbinger of the gradual erosion and delegitimization of national-level democracy in the face of unfettered, crisis-ridden globalization. This vicious cycle of social unrest and political instability may only be broken by agreements and initiatives at the supranational level, which will essentially change the rules of the game and alter the contours of political debate. By further centralizing policy domains that currently reside within the purview of national governments (immigration, taxation, unemployment, policy, welfare policy etc.), one may thus pull the carpet underneath populist and radical rhetoric and limit its appeal to small pockets of society. All the tools and answers at this time of crisis lie in Berlin, Paris, and Brussels.

Dr. Nikitas Konstantinidis
London School of Economics, Department of Government (N.Konstantinidis@lse.ac.uk), ELIAMEP, Research Associate, Greek Public Policy Forum (www.greekpublicpolicyforum.org)

]]> http://blogs.eliamep.gr/en/admin/nikitas-konstantinidis-greece-the-erosion-of-national-democratic-politics/feed/ 0 http://blogs.eliamep.gr/en/pavlos-efthymiou/pavlos-efthymioutowards-a-sustainable-union-renewing-the-promise-of-intra-eu-prosperity/ http://blogs.eliamep.gr/en/pavlos-efthymiou/pavlos-efthymioutowards-a-sustainable-union-renewing-the-promise-of-intra-eu-prosperity/#comments Tue, 01 May 2012 18:04:27 +0000 Pavlos Efthymiou http://blogs.eliamep.gr/en/?p=1511 This article seeks to add to the growing voice calling for an urgent return to the EU’s core values: democracy, prosperity, progress (e.g. Gabriel, 2011; Mallias, 2012a,b). Intra-EU processes of negotiation today, especially in the sphere of the economy, are going against the Union’s ethos, practice and mission. Seeing the peripheral member states changing governments, parliaments, and policies following external pressures and dictums is, or at least should be a worrying phenomenon for insiders and outsiders alike (Ferguson, 2011).  Europe’s leaders must not underestimate its potential ramifications. The rise of the political extremes in crisis-stricken peripheral countries as in Greece and Italy (e.g. Golden Dawn and the Northern League) cannot be taken lightly (e.g. Bounias and Donadio, 2012); nor seen separately from the – for some actual, for others perceived – humiliation of the governments and peoples of the countries receiving financial assistance from the EU and the IMF (see Papahelas, 2012).

It is unsustainable for the EU to continue teetering upon this thin line of internal cooperation and solidarity, as EU solidarity is not (or at least should not be) for sale (see discussion in Bajnai et. al., 2012). The EU’s power has long stemmed from the power of its internal market. In particular, it stems from the prospect of growth and prosperity that membership in, or partnership with it, promises. This runs a serious risk, both because of Eurozone’s and Europe’s declining economic performance, but also due to the unattractive and unfriendly mode of intra-Eurozone negotiation, which works to reassure members and non-members that Europe does not treat all its members equally. This new European reality risks making the European integration project less attractive to existing members, prospective members, neighbourhood states, as well as all other outsiders. Thankfully, as was demonstrated by the Croatian vote, there is still soft power left, but efforts to boost it are desperately needed.

The EU’s transformative, structural and normative powers are inextricably linked to this promise of either a place in the ‘post-modern paradise’ or a steady and solid relationship with a vibrant and successful EU internal market. If the latter malfunctions, there will be a smaller incentive for states to cede sovereignty in return for membership, and, equally, the emulation of the EU project will seem a less attractive path for other nations in other regions of the world.

The ‘Other’ Costs of ‘Austerity’

In one word the crisis in the EU’s attractiveness can be attributed to ‘austerity’ and the politics thereof. The policies of austerity, advocated chiefly by the IMF and the so-called ‘Merkozy’ axis, and implemented mainly by the countries of the European periphery have been so far the cornerstone of the EU’s response to the Euro-Area’s crisis and the quest for ensuring debt-sustainability for Eurozone’s ‘weakest links’. The aims or ‘general direction’ as Pagoulatos (2011) observed, is the appropriate one. Budget deficits need to be tamed, and gradually be turned into surpluses to signal a country’s ability to repay its debt, or at least the interests associated with it. Nonetheless, the remedy of austerity very rarely works, if at all. Arguably, it could work when coupled with Keynesian countermeasures – massive injections in the market, strategic and far-reaching job creation efforts (mostly state-led).

The IMF/German-led quest of higher competitiveness via horizontal cuts is a very tricky one. It could work in theory, but only in theory. In other words, put succinctly, it could only work if states imposing such austerity programmes enjoy simultaneously a highly modern, extensive production infrastructure and produce such goods (e.g. heavy industry), that a reduction in the costs of production could allow for an overwhelming boost of exports (which would in turn bring renewed wealth in the market via surpluses in the balance of trade). In times of global economic adversity, such an experiment would stand even lesser chances. Greece, Portugal and Spain are not the Asian tigers, and will not flourish through exportation of information technology; nor are they to emerge as major financial centres with privileged regimes for the attraction of foreign wealth (not least due to applying EU laws). The usual IMF recipe (which is emulated with few changes in the ‘Memorandum countries’ today) stands no chance of success in Europe if not coupled with solid countermeasures targeting growth, the diminishment of unemployment, major infrastructure developments and the quick implementation of simplifying, growth-generating reforms which pressurize the shadow economy into the actual economy and reduce the space for corruption and tax evasion (see Christodoulakis, 2011).

The Case for Growth

In other words, the EU’s underlying aim must be to keep GDP high, keep the economy growing – or pursue a swift return to growth, and help the economy create new jobs, either with strategic guidance (i.e. a comprehensive plan) or with strategic government injections in the market (i.e. subsidies or infrastructure investments, ideally in tight cooperation with the healthy forces of the private sector). If one allows the economy to slide into recession and then enforces new cuts to reduce deficits, imposing in parallel new taxation to boost government revenue, then the market dries out. As a result, the economy’s weakest firms are pushed out of the market, the stronger ones having to undertake cuts in size and ambitions, while the largest migrate out of the country. Capital – economic, but also human – flees to destinations which promise higher prosperity, better opportunities and allow for one’s capacities, skills and ambitions to flourish.

This multiple drain that ‘Europe under Austerity’ currently suffers from is killing the EU’s internal engine and the motor of EU integration – the common market. This trend must end. The answer is, indeed, ‘growth’. However, its – so far at least – rhetorical pursuit will not suffice. The ECB and the EIB particularly, must dynamically re-examine their approach, demanding a higher commitment from the member states, in order to initiate the (re-)turn to growth-generating policies. It is false to believe (or worse, passively expect) that it will boil down to one political leader, a single government or a single member state. It will require a far-reaching, collective effort of the Euro-Area countries, but also of the European family in its entirety, in order to overcome this taunting phase of European politics. The change of the tide may begin in France next week, but we all have to work together to form a solid counter-proposal to change the current approach. Francois Hollande will need more than vague suggestions and a ‘socialist identity’ in his ‘briefcase’ to sway Germany into a true change of heart, mind and strategy. It must go as far as to include solid country-specific proposals and strategies, costed and tailored to the specificities and irregularities of each country in question (e.g. Majocchi, 2011). Time is of the essence, and we must act upon this now. This must be one of the main aims of the next Greek government too.

The Way Ahead

It is clear that Europe is at yet another critical juncture. The dilemmas are big and tough – but not complicated. The two main options are further integration, or steps back at potentially much higher cost. Steps back, in the form of variable intra-EU speeds[1], groups, divisions and so forth will open the exit door for member states (small or large, poorer or richer) as these will feel that this new Europe has become less inclusive, unfriendly, or that the post-modern Kantian paradise has been distorted thanks to the (dynamic) return of European power politics. Further integration on the other hand, is not as easy as it sounds. In many countries where euro-scepticism is resurging drastically, enlightened political leaders will need to employ their charisma to soothe first, and subsequently inform and educate confused publics into the distinct value and significance the EU has for members and outsiders alike. It is a colossal political decision that we owe to our people, not only for reasons of identity and history; but more so for the political, economic, and strategic implications a failure of the European integration project now would imply for the gravitas and influence of our Union.

In the context of the multipolar world currently being shaped, a strong European pole is imperative for global stability, economic prosperity, as well as the protection and advancement of human rights and fundamental freedoms. We must never forget that the whole world looks at the EU hoping that they could once emulate our example in their own regions. We must not allow this aspiration to fade. It is crucial for the global common good.  Europe is, and must remain, the true beacon of democracy and the most solid evidence of how democracies can maximize their collective strength and authority.  We owe it to our people and the world; Europe’s political leadership must not fall short in front of this major challenge.

(This article is also published with ELIAMEP/Politics in Spires – The author wishes to thank George Arvanitidis and Petros Efthymiou for their comments and suggestions on previous editions of this article)

References

Bajnai, G., Fischer, T., Hare, S., Hoffmann, S., Nicolaïdis, K., Rossi, V., Viehoff, J. and Watt, A., eds., 2012. Solidarity: For Sale? The Social Dimension of the New European Economic Governance. Güterloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

Bounias D., Donadio R., 2012. Far-right Golden Dawn Sees Opening in Greece‘s Woes. International Herald Tribune (12^th April 2012). doi: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/world/europe/far-right-golden-dawn-sees-opening-in-greeces-woes.html?_r=1&ref=racheldonadio#

Christodoulakis N., 2011. Can One Save the Titanic? From the Memorandum Back to Growth Again. Athens: POLIS.

Ferguson N., 2011. Why EU Collapse is More Likely than the Fall of the Euro. The Washington Post (19^th November 2011). doi: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-eu-collapse-is-more-likely-than-the-fall-of-the-euro/2011/11/17/gIQAuY6wZN_story.html

Gabriel S., 2011. Setting Europe Back on its Feet. Social Europe Journal. doi: http://www.social-europe.eu/2011/09/setting-europe-back-on-its-feet/

Majocchi A., 2011. Towards a European Federal Fiscal Union. The Federalist. Pavia: Edif.

Mallias A., 2012a. My Europe: Attractive, not Fearsome. Defence and diplomacy, Issue 248, March 2012.

Mallias A., 2012b. For the Europe of Citizens with Dignity. doi: http://www.tovima.gr/default.aspx?pid=6525&la=1&aid=441248

Pagoulatos G., 2011. The Government will Survive for as Long as the Problems Impose it. doi: http://www.tovima.gr/default.aspx?pid=6525&la=1&aid=436270

Papachelas, A., 2012. Do not humiliate the Greeks. doi:  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/opinion/do-not-humiliate-the-greeks.html?_r=1

[1]Arguably, the first notable differentiation of speeds was the non-adoption of the euro by ten member-states. We have already seen how this has complicated intra-EU decision making.

This was one more episode in a country where the Shiite-Sunni rivalry in Iraq is fourteen centuries old. After Saddam Hussein’s deposal in 2003 and the emergence of the Shiites primarily, and the Kurds, as the protagonists in the domestic political scene sent alarming messages to the regional Sunni governments. Since then the Shiite-led government of Iraq is at odds with most regional Sunni states who view Baghdad as an ally of Tehran, aiming to spread and consolidate Shiite Islam in the region. Hashemi’s case is significant because it converts a domestic issue to a regional one.

Hashami’s presence in Doha, Riyadh and Ankara was greeted as an official visit by these Sunni governments. By contrast Baghdad views Hashemi as a criminal fugitive and has asked them to hand him over. Hashemi’s presence in these countries has worsened the already negative relations between the Shiite-led government of Iraq and the aforementioned states. For instance the refusal of Doha to hand him over is seen as an intervention of Qatar in the domestic affairs of Iraq.

Given that Hashemi cannot return to Iraq because of the pending criminal warrant, he is expected to take refuge, or hosted officially, by one of the leading Sunni states. This is a setback for the Sunni minority of Iraq in their effort to balance Shiite supremacy in their political domestic scene. Hashemi’s network and experience are expected to weaken and slow down their political activity in the short term.

Yet geopolitically Hashemi’s case will become a thorn for the diplomatic rapprochement between Shiite Iraq and its Sunni neighbors, distancing Baghdad further from other regional states. For instance it has sparked the diplomatic raw between Iraq and Turkey. In a Neo-Ottoman context, Ankara accused the Iraqi Primi Minister Maliki for being too self-centered in his policy and decisions. Maliki accused Ankara for interfering in domestic political issues of Iraq. This was not the first time that Turkey was involved in the Sunni-Shiite rivalry in Iraq. On 17 January 2012 both countries had ambassadors summoned to protest for remarks made on Iraqi domestic affairs.Hashemi’s case is expected to isolate further Baghdad from regional Sunni states and enhance Iraq’s rapprochement with Tehran. The Sunni-Shiite polarization in Iraq will boost rivalry in the Persian Gulf and influence developments in Syria. In the meantime Hashemi will influence Iraqi politics from his power base in one of Sunni regional states that accommodate him.