Contemporary political developments in the Arab world are crucial for the future of the region and the EU seems to be deeply concerned. The unprecedented crisis various Arab governments face as well as the way that protests are unfolded and spread at a time of deep economic crisis in the southern EU member states can become a source for trouble and instability for the latter and the EU as a whole. Recent events in Spain clearly suggest that protesters in Madrid have been creatively adopted the Tahrir Square model of protests. Regardless of the different political heritage between the northern and southern Mediterranean coasts, it becomes evident that in modern global communication can facilitate political interaction between different cultures. East and West has always been the model of global antagonism and Islam is the driving force in the Middle East.

In contrast to the orientalistic concept, according to which Islam is a unchangeable and non-progressive cultural entity, Islamic societies have shown historically a stable and dynamic evolution in all fields including economy. Recent political events in the Middle East, linked to ongoing economic and social developments, verify this argument.

The aforementioned orientalistic approach stems from the geopolitically and technologically decadent state of the Islamic world over the past four centuries, a period coinciding with the political empowerment of the Christian and Western world in general. Yet the Islamic world has its own dynamics, dictating developments in the region. The ongoing political upheavals in the Arab world are inextricably related to inner economic developments which result from global economic and cultural processes.

Over the past two decades, Islamic societies in every country in the Middle East have witnessed unprecedented urban economic and technological growth. Foreign investment and Internet contact have altered living standards and the world view of the population respectively. The economic contact between the Muslim world and the international investment centers has caused the aforementioned unprecedented urban economic development. The advent of capitalism has changed the living standards of the average middle class that seeks to share the international capitalist urban lifestyle. A key part of this lifestyle is the use of Internet and whatever that means culturally.

Part of this cultural process is the political worldview of the emerging Muslim middle class. The interaction between the middle class and the international online environment results in the adoption of liberal ideas by the newly formed bourgeoisie, bringing the latter in direct clash with the political status quo in their country.

In the last century the majority of Arab countries are run under a pro-West secular authoritarian political system administration. This hybrid political system cannot be identified neither with the Western nor the Islamic political tradition. The well-established governments are currently viewing with concern the ideological demands of the emerging bourgeoisie for political reforms and freedoms. The result of the ideological conflict between the existing political system and the urban middle class is their open clash in the streets of major cities, except Libya, where a civil war conflict is underway. A series of key questions rise from the ongoing crisis in the Arab world. A key question in this process is whether the protagonists of the new urban middle class represent the majority of the population in their country. This issue stems from the relationship between the newly emerged middle class and the Islamists as well as the fact that economic developments and the online world have not reached the majority of the rural population. In particular, the case of Egypt is quite revealing.

Most analysts have termed the Egyptian revolt as a result of the internet communication between the emerging middle-class urban youth and this seems to be quite the case. Yet, in terms of numbers it could be suggested that the protesters in the major cities of Egypt were not more than the 10%, at the very best, of the total population of the country. The vast majority of the rural population living at a state of severe poverty did not participate in the protests since they do not share the same living standards as their compatriots in the cities do. They do not have internet access and they are not in touch with the rest of the world. This silent majority seems to be the key-player for future political developments in the country. As shown below, their support for Islam as the only political power for the future of Egypt poses a great challenge for the nationalists and the secular elite of the country.

Given the above differentiation a key question is raised by the attitude of the representatives of the existing political system toward the reformists, and whether the former will concede to reforms. The Army in Egypt is the major driving force for handling the transition to a more liberal political system. Yet the clear differentiation between the rising urban middle class and the Islamists in Egypt is a major card in the hands of the military in order to balance every political tendency and keep the situation under control. The army has not convinced yet the protesters that they will keep their promises. For the military elite worries that any liberalization of the political system may backfire and may lead the country to destabilization. The main reason for their concern is the overwhelming power of the Islamic Brotherhood.

In this process the main question is whether these reforms will be the launch pad for the political liberalization of Arab societies or a Trojan horse their further Islamization by the conservatives in rural and large part of urban areas. So far the Islamic Brotherhood has supported the revolt and has adopted a wait and see policy regarding both the Mubarak regime and the army as well as the demands of the secular protesters. Islamists have participated in the protests but they have not been the spearhead. The army is aware of the Islamists’s intentions and this is perhaps the major reason for not pursuing reforms faster. Undoubtedly the military pursues a reform policy in Egypt and the system will alter in part but not essentially Yet, under these circumstances it is very unlikely that essential political reforms may occur. In a wider context the Arab world has entered a new phase in its modern history. Secular and conservative powers are expected to be the driving levers for political renovation of the various Islamic societies, exerting influence beyond the region, including the southern EU member states.