The Kosovo conundrum has made it again into the top news stories in the region and beyond, due to the strained atmosphere and tensions taking place in the North since last summer. In July 2011, while the EU-brokered dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina continued with the two sides negotiating freedom of movement of people, vehicles and goods, the Kosovar authorities tried to create a fait accompli on the ground by assuming control of the two crossing points located in the Serb-controlled North Kosovo. Pristina’s attempt failed. Predictably, North Kosovo Serbs put up strong resistance by erecting barricades in order to prevent the Kosovar state from extending its authority on a territory they have been effectively controlling since the end of the war.

To ease the tensions, especially in a period when it was striving for EU candidacy, the Serbian government reached a compromise with Pristina. On 3^rd December, only six days before the European Council was to decide whether to grant candidacy status to Serbia, the two parties agreed on integrated (joint) administration of what was seen by Serbs as administrative crossing points located on the provincial boundary between Kosovo and Serbia proper and by Albanians as Kosovo-Serbia inter-state border crossing points. Communicating the settlement to its domestic audience, Belgrade pointed out its contribution to functionality, transparency and normalisation of the conditions in situ and the absence of any statehood elements for Kosovo and urged Serbs to abandon the barricades. In the meantime, it was made clear that Serbia cannot aspire for EU candidacy, unless it makes its rebellious protesters in North Kosovo cease clashing with international peacekeepers around barricades and have them carry out the agreements.

However, despite intensive efforts put up by the government, the Serbs in North Kosovo were not convinced to terminate their mobilisation. While in the beginning it started as opposition to the unilateral acts of Pristina, it has now transformed into obstructing the implementation of the agreement with the ultimate goal to repeal it. For the mobilized Serbs of the North, accepting Kosovar IDs as valid travel documents and allowing the operation of customs control into and from Serbia would be tantamount to recognition of independent Kosovo.

Under such a perceived threat, the local leaders in North Kosovo have taken more radical steps. Since they have no official function other than local authorities with specific competences, they decided in late December to resort to the citizens, recognised as the ultimate source of power. This way, they would disclaim responsibility for not obeying their political chiefs, bind them into a less concessive policy line and have a political and legal argument to insist on denying implementation of the agreement. Making use of a law clause that enables local authorities to organise referenda within their respective area of jurisdiction, North Kosovo leaders want their people to express themselves on the question whether they “accept the institutions of the so-called Republic of Kosovo seated in Pristina”.

Expectedly, this decision prompted a series of highly negative reactions by the Belgrade government. Several senior officials deemed the initiative unconstitutional, but also meaningless, since there is a consensus among Serbs on non-recognition of the Republic of Kosovo. The officials called upon the Serb leaders in North Kosovo to abandon their plans. Moreover, they warned that such a referendum could have negative consequences for Serbia’s negotiating position on Kosovo, while it will also spoil the country’s image internationally, jeopardizing the EU candidacy prospects.

In an attempt to refute bad impressions internationally and demonstrate a constructive profile, Serbian President Tadić announced a 4-point proposal on Kosovo. Although its details have not been made public yet, the four points envision special status for North Kosovo, protection of the religious and cultural heritage, protection of the property of the citizens and the state as well as guarantees for the Serbs living in the enclaves. Reportedly, the plan was in line with the Ahtisaari provisions, but did not touch upon the statehood question. Tadić’s initiative was hailed by several Western governments, yet not by Kosovars. All the same, in late January the intransigent North Kosovo elites also rejected the proposal, dismissing it as a mere copy of the Ahtisaari plan.

Why do the North Kosovo Serbs insist on uncompromising positions which make Belgrade’s position yet more difficult? One way to explain this is by examining intra-Serbian party politics. Clearly, Serbia’s failure to gain EU candidacy status on 9^th December was a major blow for the ruling coalition parties. Should this development is repeated during the March session of the European Council session it will further plummet the Democratic Party’s electoral prospects in the upcoming parliamentary elections. The Serbian opposition parties, which form the majority in most of the municipal assemblies in North Kosovo, realize that for as long as Serbs man the North Kosovo barricades the implementation of the agreement while the oppositions electoral will be further strengthened. It is not accidental that in Leposavić, the only North Kosovo municipality run by the ruling Democratic Party, the municipal assembly took its time before it passes the referendum bill and did so only in a session that Democratic Party deputies did not attend. The micropolitics of North Kosovo municipalities demonstrate how local Kosovo Serb politics are inextricably linked to national party politics in Serbia.

However, the adamant resistance of North Kosovo Serbs goes beyond serving political party ends. What became more than clear in recent months is that North Kosovo Serbs’ and Belgrade government’s red lines are not always the same. As a result, North Kosovo Serbs seem, like never before, resolved not to conform to Belgrade’s decisions, but rather have it their own way. They cannot of course claim that the Serbian government does not speak in their name; by their definition, they are part of Serbia and hence the Belgrade government is their only legitimate authority. Still, North Kosovo Serbs seem now more determined to speak with their own voice or at least to have it heard. The calls for the declaration of independence of North Kosovo, no matter how unrealistic or even undesirable this scenario may be, are nevertheless indicative of the North Kosovo Serbs’ disposition.

As European countries become more assertive asking from Belgrade concessions on Kosovo in return for progress in the EU accession process the Serbian government’s ‘both EU and Kosovo’ policy will likely prove increasingly volatile. It can plausibly be expected that the rift between North Kosovo Serbs and the Belgrade government will only widen in the coming months.  The consequences for the explosive Kosovo Serb problem may prove dire.